Posts

Showing posts from August, 2017

NTLMRelayX and MITMf

-
Image
Introduction: Recently I have been playing around with the Man-In-The-Middle Framework (MITMf) and have found it to be the most successful tool for me to use on internal penetration tests and significantly more reliable than similar spoofing tools such as Ettercap. MITMf is a modularized framework written in Python which is capable of both establishing MITM attacks and utilizing them in very productive ways. The built-in modules make performing complicated MITM attacks extremely simple with things such as SMBAuth, BeEF injection, MSF’s BrowserSniper, BDFProxy, NetCreds, Responder, etc. Outside of just this combination, I highly recommend over any other MITM tool. Learn it, use it, live it. There are a lot of people who use tools such as Responder to trick systems into sending NTLM credentials then relaying them with SMBRelayX (if you aren’t already doing this on internals, get on it). Although highly successful, it is quickly becoming more and more difficult to pull off as a p...
Post a Comment
Read more

Popular posts from this blog

No Shells Required - a Walkthrough on Using Impacket and Kerberos to Delegate Your Way to DA

-
There are a ton of great resources that have been released in the past few years on a multitude of Kerberos delegation abuse avenues.   However, most of the guidance out there is pretty in-depth and/or focuses on the usage of @Harmj0y’s Rubeus.   While Rubeus is a super well-written tool that can do quite a few things extremely well, in engagements where I’m already running off of a primarily Linux environment, having tools that function on that platform can be beneficial.   To that end, all the functionality we need to perform unconstrained, constrained, and resource-based constrained delegation attacks is already available to us in the impacket suite of tools. This post will cover how to identify potential delegation attack paths, when you would want to use them, and give detailed  walkthroughs  of how to perform them on a Linux platform.   What we won’t be covering in this guide is a detailed background of Kerberos authentication, or how various type...
Read more

Executing Macros From a DOCX With Remote Template Injection

-
The What: In this post, I want to talk about and show off a code execution method which was shown to me a little while back. This method allows one to create a DOCX document which will load up and allow a user to execute macros using a remote DOTM template file. This attack has been seen in the wild, is partially included in open-source offensive security tools , as has been blogged about by Cisco Talos , but in the blog post and the open-source tool, it is only seen as a credential stealing attack typically over the SMB protocol. This blog post will detail how to use this method to download a macro-enabled template over HTTP(S) in a proxy-aware method into a DOCX document. The Why: The benefit of this attack versus a traditional macro enabled document is multidimensional. When executing a phishing attack against a target, you able to attach the .docx directly to the email and you are very unlikely to get blocked based on the file extension. Many organizations block .doc or .do...
Read more

One Click to Compromise -- Fun With ClickOnce Deployment Manifests

-
Note: I submitted a report to MSRC regarding the hash-disclosure vulnerability associated with ClickOnce deployment manifests. After review I got a response back earlier in July where it was noted that the vulnerability did not meet the bar for immediate servicing and was given the green light to disclose. Edit 9/22:  MS has remediated the NTLM-disclosure part of this issue as of KB4576630 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4576630/kb4576630   However, this method will still work as a delivery mechanism for stage-0 payloads. TL;DR ClickOnce Deployment Manifests are a relatively unknown way to both get an initial payload into an environment as well as remotely retrieve NTLM challenge-response hashes over HTTP.  Hash retrieval occurs on initial file open (before any warnings pop) meaning that even if the user opts to close out on the warning, we still have a hash we can attempt to crack.   IE also has some interesting interactions with these files and will au...
Read more