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Assembly.Lie – Using Transactional NTFS and API Hooking to Trick the CLR into Loading Your Code “From Disk”

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  Introduction: Assembly.Load, a method that has been one of the primary reasons for the meteoric rise in offensive tooling written in C# over the past few years.  Its most commonly used overload in offensive tooling – Assembly.Load(byte[]) allows for memory-only loading of .Net assembly objects (.exe / .dll) directly from a byte array representing the object’s contents, effectively granting the ability to reflectively load and execute a program entirely in memory in just 2-3 lines of code. This has enabled all sorts of multi-staged payloads, modular program functionality, and fileless post-exploitation operations.  A few months back some tooling I was working on caused me to take a closer look into the mechanisms behind loading assemblies into the .net Common Language Runtime (CLR).  I found that while Assembly.Load has several overloads that all correspond to the same managed method, the unmanaged functions they call vary quite drastically.  Through this process, I attempted to deter
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No Shells Required - a Walkthrough on Using Impacket and Kerberos to Delegate Your Way to DA

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There are a ton of great resources that have been released in the past few years on a multitude of Kerberos delegation abuse avenues.   However, most of the guidance out there is pretty in-depth and/or focuses on the usage of @Harmj0y’s Rubeus.   While Rubeus is a super well-written tool that can do quite a few things extremely well, in engagements where I’m already running off of a primarily Linux environment, having tools that function on that platform can be beneficial.   To that end, all the functionality we need to perform unconstrained, constrained, and resource-based constrained delegation attacks is already available to us in the impacket suite of tools. This post will cover how to identify potential delegation attack paths, when you would want to use them, and give detailed  walkthroughs  of how to perform them on a Linux platform.   What we won’t be covering in this guide is a detailed background of Kerberos authentication, or how various types of delegation work in-depth
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Executing Macros From a DOCX With Remote Template Injection

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The What: In this post, I want to talk about and show off a code execution method which was shown to me a little while back. This method allows one to create a DOCX document which will load up and allow a user to execute macros using a remote DOTM template file. This attack has been seen in the wild, is partially included in open-source offensive security tools , as has been blogged about by Cisco Talos , but in the blog post and the open-source tool, it is only seen as a credential stealing attack typically over the SMB protocol. This blog post will detail how to use this method to download a macro-enabled template over HTTP(S) in a proxy-aware method into a DOCX document. The Why: The benefit of this attack versus a traditional macro enabled document is multidimensional. When executing a phishing attack against a target, you able to attach the .docx directly to the email and you are very unlikely to get blocked based on the file extension. Many organizations block .doc or .do
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One Click to Compromise -- Fun With ClickOnce Deployment Manifests

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Note: I submitted a report to MSRC regarding the hash-disclosure vulnerability associated with ClickOnce deployment manifests. After review I got a response back earlier in July where it was noted that the vulnerability did not meet the bar for immediate servicing and was given the green light to disclose. Edit 9/22:  MS has remediated the NTLM-disclosure part of this issue as of KB4576630 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4576630/kb4576630   However, this method will still work as a delivery mechanism for stage-0 payloads. TL;DR ClickOnce Deployment Manifests are a relatively unknown way to both get an initial payload into an environment as well as remotely retrieve NTLM challenge-response hashes over HTTP.  Hash retrieval occurs on initial file open (before any warnings pop) meaning that even if the user opts to close out on the warning, we still have a hash we can attempt to crack.   IE also has some interesting interactions with these files and will automatically execute
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